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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: THE CHINESE WALL
AND BANK FINANCING OF HOSTILE TENDER
OFFERS
A commercial bank may have a conflict of interest problem when a
corporate customer asks the bank to finance a hostile cash tender offer for
the stock of another customer.1 This conflict arises if the bank has re-
ceived material, inside information from the target customer.2 In order to
abate conflicts of interest, banks often establish a procedure popularly
called a "Chinese Wall. ' '3 The purpose of the Chinese Wall is to assure
that the confidential information received by the bank personnel from the
target company is not transferred to the offeror or to the bank personnel
responsible for the offeror's account.4 In Washington Steel Corp. v. TW
Corp.,5 the Third Circuit considered the effects of a Chinese Wall on a
bank's alleged liability to a customer because the bank agreed to finance a
hostile tender offer for the stock of that customer.6 The Third Circuit
decided whether a bank owes the target customer a per se fiduciary duty
to refrain from financing the tender offer.7 The Washington Steel court
also addressed an alternative claim that a bank is liable for the misuse of
confidential information received from the target if the bank uses the in-
formation to decide whether to finance the tender offer.8
In 1974, Washington Steel furnished Chemical Bank with ten-year
cash flow and earnings projections9 in connection with a credit agreement
' See Securities and Exchange Commission Legislative Proposals on Tender Offers,
Beneficial Ownership, Issuer Repurchases, 542 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 5 (Special Sup-
plement Feb. 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEC Legislative Proposals].
' See id.
3 See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1974); Herzel &
Colling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73, 74, 75 n.2
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Herzel]. Investment banking departments of securities firms and
banks are major users of Chinese Wall procedures. The wall prevents material, inside infor-
mation concerning a customer from flowing to the securities firm's sales department or to
the bank's trust department. See generally Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398
(2d Cir. 1974); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of
Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 459 (1975); Herzel, supra.
4 See Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 603 (3d Cir. 1979); Harnisch-
feger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 & n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
' See id. at 601-04.
See text accompanying notes 19-24 infra.
B See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra. In addition to alleging that the bank used
the confidential information in deciding whether to finance the tender offer, a target cus-
tomer may claim that the bank misused the information by disclosing the information to the
tender offeror. See text accompanying notes 48-56 & 62-65 infra.
' Washington Steel alleged that the cash flow and earnings projections were the confi-
dential information it gave to Chemical. 602 F.2d at 596. What information given to a bank
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with Chemical for an amount up to $2,250,000.10 Chemical also was a ma-
jor lender of Talley Industries, the parent company of TW Corporation.
Talley asked Chemical on January 13, 1979, to finance Talley's possible
acquisition of Washington Steel. Two days later, members of the Chemi-
cal Banking Department discussed the possibility of financing the pro-
posed acquisition. Although Chemical's senior officer present knew about
the outstanding loan to Washington Steel, he decided that Chemical
should finance the acquisition so long as Talley was creditworthy.11
Subsequently, Washington Steel rejected two different merger propos-
als by Talley and sent a letter to its stockholders urging rejection of Tal-
ley's tender offer.1 2 On February 5, 1979, Washington Steel initiated suit
in federal court to enjoin the tender offer."3 Washington Steel alleged that
Chemical violated its fiduciary duty to Washington Steel by misusing
confidential information obtained from Washington Steel in deciding to
finance Talley's tender offer.1 ' The district court issued a preliminary in-
a court would consider confidential is unclear. As one court stated, the line between what
information is "legally confidential" and "only qualifiedly confidential" is very difficult to
draw since a target company gives some of the information to other banks, accountants, tax-
preparers, suppliers, its stockholders, and the public. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continen-
tal Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Since the target company
in American Medicorp could not prove that the bank improperly used the alleged confiden-
tial information, the court elected not to draw the line. Id. The SEC describes confidential
information as material, non-public information. See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note
1, at 5.
10 602 F.2d at 596. Chemical was part of a three bank agreement to lend Washington
Steel a total of $10,000,000. The lead bank, Pittsburgh National Bank, agreed to advance up
to $5,500,000. Morgan Guaranty Trust agreed to lend up to $2,250,000. Id. Chemical also
was the registrar for Washington Steel's common stock. Id.
11 Id. Chemical executed a commitment letter three days after the banking department
meeting agreed to finance Talley's tender offer. Id. John Roach, who supervised Washington
Steel's account at Chemical, was a participant at the meeting. Mr. Roach informed the
others present only that Chemical had an outstanding loan to Washington Steel and that he
did not know what Washington Steel's reaction to the tender offer would be. Id. at 596, 602-
03; see note 27 infra.
21 The first merger proposal was dated January 19, 1979. Talley offered to pay $36.00
per share for Washington Steel's common stock. 602 F.2d at 595-97. The second proposal,
dated January 26, 1979, offered $37.50 per share. Id. at 597. In connection with the tender
offer, Talley filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Schedule 14D-1 State-
ment as required by § 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d) (1976). 602 F.2d at 597. Talley also filed a registration statement with the Penn-
sylvania Securities Commission. Id.
13 See Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 602
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
14 602 F.2d at 597. In addition to a claim of misuse of confidential information, Wash-
ington Steel alleged in its complaint filed in district court that Talley violated § 14(d) & (e)
of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) & (e) (1976), through inadequate disclosures and decep-
tive practices in connection with the tender offer. 602 F.2d at 597. Three days after filing
suit in district court, Washington Steel requested a hearing before the Pennsylvania Securi-
ties Commission with respect to the tender offer. The Pennsylvania Commission denied the




junction against Chemical's financing the tender offer, ruling that Chemi-
cal breached a common law fiduciary duty owed to Washington Steel aris-
ing upon receipt of Washington Steel's confidential information.1 5
The Third Circuit, on appeal, reversed the district court's preliminary
injunction against Chemical. 6 Washington Steel urged two possible
grounds to support its claim that Chemical violated a common law fiduci-
ary duty owed to Washington Steel. Washington Steel maintained that
Chemical violated a fiduciary duty by misusing Washington Steel's confi-
dential information." Alternatively, Washington Steel maintained that,
by receiving the confidential information, Chemical implicitly assumed a
per se fiduciary duty not to aid another company's efforts to subvert
Washington Steel's interests. 18
The Third Circuit rejected Washington Steel's per se fiduciary duty
claim because of important policies.19 The court reasoned that prohibiting
a bank from financing a hostile tender offer would curtail the availability
15 Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100, 1105-06 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
The district court reasoned that Chemical was Washington Steel's agent because Chemical
was the transfer agent for Washington Steel and because Chemical received confidential
information from Washington Steel. As Washington Steel's agent, the district court held
that Chemical had a fiduciary duty not to act adversely to Washington Steel's interests. Id.
at 1104-05. The district court, however, did not enjoin the tender offer. Id. at 1106.
16 602 F.2d at 604. While the appeal was pending, Talley withdrew its tender offer after
WS-B, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Blount, Inc., offered $40 per share for Washington
Steel's common stock. Id. at 598. Since Talley withdrew the tender offer, Washington Steel
argued that Chemical's appeal was moot. Id. The circuit court held that the appeal was not
moot since Chemical might have been able to recover damages under the $2,000,000 injunc-
tion bond posted by Washington Steel. Chemical must show that the preliminary injunction
was wrongfully ordered in order to recover under the bond. Id. at 598-99.
1 Id. at 599; see text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
10 602 F.2d at 599; see text accompanying notes 19-24 infra.
29 602 F.2d at 601. Washington Steel cited M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86,
207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924), as support for its per se rule. In M.L. Stewart two compa-
nies bidding on property were customers of the same bank. The plaintiff, Stewart, falsely
informed the defendant, Marcus, the vice-president of the bank, that the plaintiff had won
the bid and asked for assurances of a loan. The defendant agreed, but subsequently learned
that the plaintiff had not won the bid. The defendant then submitted a successful bid for
the property on behalf of the second company. Id. at 88, 207 N.Y.S. at 687. Stewart sued,
alleging that the request for the loan created a fiduciary duty in the bank which the bank
breached when the defendant placed the successful bid for the other company. The New
York court rejected the plaintiff's contentions. Id. at 94, 207 N.Y.S. at 693. Although noting
that courts occasionally will impose a fiduciary duty, the New York court stated that courts
should try "to "harmonize the necessities of a competitive industrial system of business with
the teachings of morality." Id. at 92, 207 N.Y.S. at 691. The New York court determined
that since the plaintiff lied to the defendant about the bid, no fiduciary duty existed. Id. at
94, 207 N.Y.S. at 693.
The Washington Steel court correctly noted that M.L. Stewart does not support Wash-
ington Steel's per se rule of fiduciary duty. 602 F.2d at 599-600. The M.L. Stewart court
sought to harmonize the necessities of competitive business. See 124 Misc. at 92, 207 N.Y.S.
at 691. A per se rule, however, would undermine the economic necessities discussed by the
M.L. Stewart court. See 602 F.2d at 600; text accompanying notes 20-21 & 33-35 infra.
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of funding for capital ventures. 20 The court suggested that, if a per se
duty existed, a company could insulate itself from possible takeovers by
simply arranging a series of loans from most major banks and supplying
the banks with confidential information. 21 The Washington Steel court
also reasoned that the legislature is the most appropriate forum to bal-
ance the financial issues involved with a bank customer's expectation of
loyalty.2 2 Recognizing the need for uniform rules in banking,22 the court
feared that federal law would preempt any implicit state common law
rule of a per se duty.
2'
Ruling on Washington Steel's alternative theory that Chemical mis-
used confidential information supplied to Chemical by Washington Steel,
the Third Circuit held that the evidence did not establish that Chemical
used the confidential information in deciding to make the loan to Tal-
20 602 F.2d at 601; accord, American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. IlM. 1977). In American Medicorp, Continental Bank
agreed to finance Humana, Inc.'s hostile tender offer for American Medicorp's common
stock. Id. at 7. American Medicorp sought to enjoin the tender offer, alleging that the bank
had a per se fiduciary duty not to finance the tender offer. Id. The court rejected the claim
and reasoned that a per se rule would burden the free flow of bank financing. Id. at 9.
Only one other court has considered the legal issues raised by Washington Steel. Ten
days before the Third Circuit decided Washington Steel, a district court in the Eastern
District for Wisconsin rejected a per se rule of fiduciary duty identical to the one raised by
Washington Steel. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1153-54 (E.D.
Wis. 1979). The Wisconsin District Court rejected the district court's opinion in Washing-
ton Steel and accepted the American Medicorp rationale. Id. The Harnischfeger court
neither found any evidence of a breach of the bank's Chinese Wall erected within its loan
department nor that the bank had a per se fiduciary duty to the target company. Id.
11 602 F.2d at 601; see Regulation under Federal Banking and Securities Laws of Per-
sons Involved in Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976) (statement of Gordon T. Wallis,
Chairman of the Board, Irving Trust Co.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
22 602 F.2d at 601.
23 No federal banking laws currently prohibit a bank from financing a hostile tender
offer directed at a customer. See Cole, Role of Banks Challenged in Unfriendly Takeovers,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1979, at D1, col. 1, D6, col. 3 (statement by Federal Reserve Chairman
William E. Miller) [hereinafter cited as Unfriendly Takeovers].
"1 602 F.2d at 601. The Washington Steel court did not suggest that a court could
imply a state common law rule of a per se duty. See id. At least three state securities com-
missions, including Pennsylvania, the home state of Washington Steel, have ruled that a
bank neither breaches a fiduciary duty nor violates a state securities law by financing a
hostile tender offer for the stock of one of its customers. See Washington Steel Corp. v. TW
Corp., 602 F.2d at 597 (Pennsylvania); Bank Did Not Violate Wisconsin Law in Financing
Client's Hostile Takeover, 519 Sac. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-21, 22 (Sept. 12, 1979) (involv-
ing Paccar, Inc.'s attempt to acquire Harnischfeger Corp.); Unfriendly Takeovers, supra
note 23, at D6, col. 3 (South Carolina, involving Brascan Ltd. of Canada's takeover attempt
of F.W. Woolworth).
The SEC has proposed legislation which would preempt state tender offer laws except
for those relating to tender offers for truly "local" companies. See SEC Legislative Propos-
als, supra note 1, at 23, 29. The SEC does not intend the proposed legislation to preempt
state laws concerning fiduciary duties of corporate officers, directors, or controlling share-
holders owed to the company's shareholders. Id. at 29.
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ley2 5 Chemical constructed a Chinese Wall around Washington Steel's
files and the personnel who worked on the Washington Steel account.
Chemical prohibited the personnel on the Talley account from talking
with anyone working on the Washington Steel account and from looking
at any Washington Steel fie. The officer responsible for the Washington
Steel account personally secured all of the target company's fies and
thereby prevented any possible use of those files by the Chemical person-
nel working on the Talley loan.28 In addition, the court noted that Chemi-
cal decided to finance the tender offer on the basis of Talley's financial
standing and Chemical's long-term familiarity with Talley.
27
The Washington Steel court further reasoned that even if a bank uses
the targets confidential information in deciding to finance the tender of-
fer, the bank would not violate any duty owed to the target.28 The court
justified this view by claiming that the prohibition of the use of confiden-
tial information could force a bank to make a loan blindly.29 By making a
blind loan, the court suggested that the bank would violate a duty owed
to its depositors.30 Alternatively, a no-use rule might discourage banks
from lending money to finance tender offers.31 The court believed that the
adverse implication of a no-use rule would restrict the free flow of funds
and, thus, have the same effect as a per se rule of fiduciary duty.
3 2
The Washington Steel court correctly rejected a per se fiduciary duty
prohibiting a bank from financing a hostile tender offer directed at a cus-
tomer. As the court stated, companies seeking to insulate themselves
from takeovers could arrange a series of loans from most major banks,
thereby foreclosing banks as financial sources for potential tender offer-
ors.33 A bank customer is entitled to no more protection from a hostile
tender offer than it is in other business contexts." Since a bank customer
cannot petition a court to enjoin the bank from lending money to a com-
petitor, a court should not enjoin the financing of a hostile tender offer
1 602 F.2d at 602-03; see note 48 infra.
' See 602 F.2d at 603.
Id. at 602. Chemical performed a worst-case analysis of Talley's ability to repay the
loan. This analysis convinced Chemical of Talley's ability to cover its debt service. Id. The
Washington Steel court noted that the silence of the Chemical officer in charge of the
Washington Steel account at Chemical's initial meeting to discuss the Talley loan was not
an implicit recommendation of the loan by that officer. The officer could have done nothing
more than remain silent after informing the participants at the meeting about Chemical's
loan to Washington Steel. Id. at 602-03; see note 11 supra.
U 602 F.2d at 603-04.
" Id. at 603.
0 Id.
32 Id.
" Id.; see text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
s 602 F.2d at 601.
" See Note, Bank Financing of Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: A
Breach of a Fiduciary Duty?, 53 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 827, 835-36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Bank Financing].
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for the customer's stock. 5 Furthermore, although a target company has
standing under the federal tender offer laws to seek an injunction of a
tender offer,8" the policy behind these laws suggests that enjoining bank
financing of a tender offer, based on a per se fiduciary duty, would be
improper. The policy behind the federal tender offer laws is full disclo-
sure. 37 Those laws are not designed to favor one party in a tender offer
battle.8 A court would thus frustrate this balancing policy by enjoining
bank financing of a tender offer.39
The Washington Steel court's reasoning in its dictum allowing a bank
to use the target's confidential information, however, is questionable. A
bank that does not use the confidential information in making a decision
to finance a hostile tender offer is no more "blind" than any other bank
without the benefit of the confidential information."0 Since evidence sug-
gests that banks do not use confidential information in making their loan
decisions," a no-use rule would not-restrict the free flow of funds as the
Third Circuit suggested. 42 Additionally, although no per se fiduciary duty
should exist between a bank and its customers, 43 a bank should not avail
itself of confidential information to the detriment of the supplier of that
information.44 A bank customer properly expects that the bank will not
35 See id.
36 See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946-
47 (2d Cir. 1969); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 816-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Aranow,
Einhorn, & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams Act, 32 Bus.
LAw. 1755, 1763 (1977). Although a target company can seek injunctive relief under the
federal tender offer laws, neither a tender offeror nor a target has standing to bring an
action for damages. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (tender offeror);
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. at 816 (target company).
37 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977).
See id.; Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); SEC Legisla-
tive Proposals, supra note 1, at 5.
39 See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 9. An injunction of a bank's financ-
ing of a tender offer would give the management of the target an unfair advantage. Id.
40 See Note, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp.: Bank Confidentiality in Corporate
Takeovers, 68 CAL. L. REV. 153, 160 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bank Confidentiality].
41 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra; Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1151, 1153 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (no breach of bank's Chinese Wall); American Medicorp,
Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (evidence
not sufficient to prove bank used confidential information); Senate Hearings, supra note 21,
at 47-48 (statement by Gordon T. Wallis) (Irving Trust Co. prohibits use of confidential
information supplied by target customer).
4 In American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp.
5 (N.D. Ill. 1977), the court held that a bank cannot rely on confidential information sup-
plied by the target when making a decision whether to finance the hostile tender offer. Id. at
8. The court suggested that because of the many contingencies which make a takeover spec-
ulative, a bank would not be using good business judgment if the bank decided to finance a
tender offer on the assumption that the target's assets were required to repay the loan. Id.
at 9; see note 9 supra.
43 See text accompanying notes 19-24 & 33-39 supra.
4' See Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); M.L. Stewart &
Co. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 90, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Bank Confidentiality,
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use the confidential information to its own advantage.45 This justifiable
expectation has led courts to hold banks to a fiduciary standard of con-
duct when the bank has accepted a customer's trust and confidence by
receiving confidential information.4 6 Such a restricted fiduciary duty does
disadvantage the bank to some degree. A court, however, must weigh the
inconvenience caused by the imposition of a limited fiduciary duty
against the legitimate expectations of the customer.
47
An issue which Washington Steel did not address is whether a bank
or the offeror violates federal securities laws if the bank conveys the con-
fidential information to the offeror.4 ' The resolution of this issue probably
depends on whether the offeror decides to proceed with the tender offer
after it receives the confidential information about the target. If the of-
feror continues with the offer and does not disclose the information pub-
licly, the stockholders of the target probably could sue the bank and the
offeror for damages under sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 ('34 Act)49 and under Rule 10b-5.50 The bank would
supra note 40, at 160; Bank Financing, supra note 34, at 836-37.
5 See M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 90, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 689 (Sup. Ct.
1924); Bank Confidentiality, supra note 40, at 160; Bank Financing, supra note 34, at 836-
37. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLrry, DR 4-101(B)(2), (3) (1979) (lawyer
cannot use client's confidences or secrets to disadvantage of client or for advantage of lawyer
or third person).
46 See, e.g., Trice v. Comestock, 121 F. 620, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1903); Pigg v. Robertson,
549 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Bank Confidentiality, supra note 40, at 155; Bank
Financing, supra note 34, at 827-32.
'7 For a more thorough discussion of the nature of a bank's fiduciary duty to a corpo-
rate customer, see Bank Financing, supra note 34, at 827-32, 836-37.
If a bank does have a fiduciary duty not to use confidential information in deciding
whether to finance a tender offer, the duty may be impossible to inforce. The three courts
which have addressed the issue are unclear about which party has the burden of proving use
or nonuse of the confidential information. See Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602
F.2d 594, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1979); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151,
1153-54 (E.D. Wis. 1979); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 8-9 (N.D. IM. 1977). If the target must prove that the bank misused the
information, the target probably could not satisfy the burden short of having a bank em-
ployee testify that the bank actually used the information. See Senate Hearings, supra note
21, at 26 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis). If the bank has the burden of proving nonuse and
if proof of a Chinese Wall does not satisfy that burden, a bank probably could not meet its
burden of proof. Consequently, placing a burden of proof on the bank could lead to a per se
prohibition against the financing. See text accompanying notes 19-24 & 33-39 supra.
48 Since Washington Steel did not allege that Chemical had relayed any confidences to
Talley, the Washington Steel court determined that it had no occasion to decide whether a
court could enjoin a bank from financing a hostile tender offer when the bank actually pro-
vided the offeror with confidential information obtained from and concerning the target. 602
F.2d at 602, 604. The court noted, however, that if the bank had supplied such confidential
information to the offeror, the bank might have violated § 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1976), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). 602
F.2d at 603-04.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) forbids any person to misstate or
omit a material fact, or engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or prac-
tices, in connection with a tender offer. Id. § 78n(e).
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be liable as a tipper,5 1 and the offeror would be liable as a tippee.5 2 Liabil-
ity, however, is doubtful if the offeror elects to withhold the tender offer
after receiving the confidential information.5" Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 require that the alleged disclosure was in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.54 A prerequisite for liability under section 14(e) is
that the disclosure was in connection with a tender offer.5 5 Since the of-
feror elected not to make the tender offer, the tip by the bank was not in
connection with a purchase, a sale, or a tender offer.
5 6
Another problem involving the federal securities laws and bank
financing of tender offers is the disclosure requirement of section 13(d) of
the '34 Act.5" Under section 13(d), a tender offeror must disclose to the
SEC and the offerees the source of funds used in making the tender of-
fer." The section excepts disclosure if a commercial bank provides the
funds in the ordinary course of business. 59 Congress included this excep-
tion to prevent the target company from pressuring the bank to withhold
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 6, 11,
27.
" "Tipping" is the selective disclosure of material, inside information that has not been
disseminated publicly. See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 6 n.8. See also Sha-
piro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 230-31, 241 (2d Cir. 1974)
(non-trading tippers and trading tippees liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(insider-tipper liable under § 10b and Rule lOb-5).
52 A bank's disclosure of confidential information to the tender offeror presents a situa-
tion similar to Shaprio v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974). In Shapiro, Merrill Lynch was the managing underwriter of a debenture offering by
Douglas Aircraft Company. Douglas had given Merrill Lynch certain material, adverse in-
side information regarding Douglas's earnings. Before this confidential information became
public, Merrill Lynch disclosed the information to some of its customers. These customers
proceeded to sell their holdings in Douglas. Id. at 231-32. The Shapiro court held that both
Merrill Lynch and its customers were liable under § 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 as
"tipper" and "tippees" respectively. Id. at 231, 241. The only major difference in the situa-
tion of bank disclosure would be that the tender offeror-tippee bought the target's stock
after receiving non-public information about the target.
53 See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 6. If the offeror does not proceed
with the tender offer, the SEC possibly can maintain an injunctive action against the bank.
Id. Rule 10b-5 proscribes conduct which not only operates but also would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon investors, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). See SEC v. Lure's, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1046, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (tipping works unfairness in market even if tippee takes no di-
rect action on information conveyed).
- 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 6. See also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-75 (1975) (plaintiff must be actual purchaser or seller
to have standing under Rule 10b-5); Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773,
789 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (liability under § 14(e) occurs only if tender offer existed).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. H 1978). Section 13(d) lists what an offeror must include
in his tender offer statement filed with the SEC. Id.; see note 62 infra.




financing for the tender offer." This exception, however, discourages dis-
closure of any conflict of interest the bank may have and arguably is in-
consistent with the full disclosure policy of the federal securities laws.
6 1
The SEC recently recommended amendments to sections 13(d) and
14(d) of the '34 Act 62 due to these twin problems.6 3 Under the proposed
section 14(d) amendment, a bank could not disclose to the offeror any
material, non-public information concerning the target without the tar-
get's consent.6 4 Consequently, the bank would violate the securities laws
irrespective of the offeror's decision to proceed with the tender offer.65
The amended section 13(d) would require the offeror to disclose the name
of the financing bank unless, after reasonable inquiry, the offeror does not
have reason to know that any prior or present commercial relationship 6
exists between the bank and the target.6 7 The SEC believes that this pro-
60 See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 9.
61 See id.
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Section 14(d) currently prohibits
any person from making a tender offer which would result in his owning more than five
percent of a class of securities registered under § 12 of the '34 Act, id. § 78(1), unless he has
filed a statement with the SEC. The person also must furnish each offeree with the state-
ment, and the statement must contain the information required under § 13(d) of the '34
Act, id. § 78m(d). Section 14(d) also imposes certain substantive restrictions on the terms of
an offer, with respect to such matters as right of withdrawal, extensions, and variations of
the offer. Id. § 78n(d).
63 See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 10, 20-22. The SEC submitted these
proposals pursuant to a request by Senators Proxmire, Sarbanes, and Williams. Id. at 2-4.
The SEC recognized that an absolute ban on bank financing of a tender offer, if the bank
has received confidential information, would upset the balance of the federal tender offer
laws not to favor one side of a tender offer battle. Id. at 5; see text accompanying notes 36-
39 supra.
" See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 10, 22, 27.
615 The proposed § 14(d) probably would not attach liability to the tender offeror if the
bank discloses the confidential information to the offeror. See id. at 11 n.34. The SEC be-
lieves, however, that the prohibition against disclosure by the bank would preclude the of-
feror from ever receiving the information. Id.
A "prior commercial relationship" would exist provided the relationship between the
bank and the target satisfies two conditions. The target must have had a business relation-
ship with the bank within two years before the offeror first approached the bank concerning
the financing of the tender offer. Second, the relationship may have provided the bank with
access to material, non-public information concerning the target. Id. at 10.
67 Id. at 10, 21, 25. In addition to the recommended amendment to § 13(d), the SEC
considered two alternative amendments to § 13(d). The first alternative would allow the
offeror to withhold the bank's identity only if the bank is not in possession of any material,
non-public information obtained from the target company. Id. at 9. The SEC rejected this
alternative because once the offeror learns that the bank possesses material, non-public in-
formation, the offeror might draw inferences from the bank's loan decision about the
financial status of the target company. Id. The second alternative would delete entirely the
current disclosure exception applicable to banks. Id. at 10. The SEC rejected this deletion
because it would permit the target to use its influence to dissuade the bank from financing
the tender offer. Id. The SEC chose the submitted proposal because any inferences which a
bidder could draw from the mere existence of a commercial relationship would be highly
speculative. Id. See also text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
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posal is necessary in order to make section 13(d) consistent with the full
disclosure policy of the federal securities laws.68 The SEC, however, is
opposed to any specific legislation concerning bank use of confidential in-
formation about the target in deciding to finance a tender offer.6 9 Instead,
the SEC asked Congress to give the SEC additional rulemaking authority
to govern bank use of confidential information.
7 0
These legislative proposals do not appear to place any additional bur-
dens on banks and tender offerors. The proposed anti-fraud amendment
to section 14(d) apparently does no more than codify a recognized com-
mon law duty not to disclose one customer's confidential information to
another customer.71 If a bank were to disclose confidential information to
the offeror, the target or the SEC also may have an impossible task prov-
ing that the disclosure occurred.7 2 Additionally, while the proposed dis-
closure requirement of section 13(d) will provide the target's stockholders
with more information, this amendment will not furnish any real aid to
the target company. Once a bank has decided to finance the tender offer,
the bank probably realizes that the target will take its business elsewhere
if the tender offer is not successful. 3 Since the bank has accepted the
possible loss of the target as a customer, the target will have little lever-
age by which to pressure the bank to withhold the financing.
Based on the Washington Steel decision 74 and the SEC legislative
proposals,75 a bank does not have a per se fiduciary duty prohibiting it
from financing a hostile takeover of one of its customers. The bank must
realize, however, that it must respect the confidential nature of any infor-
mation which the bank received from the target. If the bank discloses the
target's confidential information to the offeror, the bank faces possible
liability under the federal securities laws.70 Although the Washington
" See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, at 9; text accompanying notes 57-61
supra.
69 See SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note 1, 11-12. Since the issue of bank use of
confidential information only recently has become the subject of controversy, the SEC fears
that any legislation at this time may not provide the flexibility needed to respond ade-
quately to the issue. Id. at 11.
70 Id. at 12, 13. The SEC recommended that Congress add a new subsection to § 14 of
the '34 Act. Under the proposed addition, Congress would give the SEC rulemaking author-
ity to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative involving
the planning, financing, or otherwise participating in, or rendering advice in connection with
any tender offer. The SEC also would have authority to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such acts and practices. Id.
71 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra; cf. SEC Legislative Proposals, supra note
1, at 27 (banks generally recognize duty not to disclose under § 10b and Rule 10b-5).
"' See Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 26 (statement of Gordon T. Wallis). See also
note 47 supra.
73 See American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F.
Supp. 5, 8-9 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 46-47, 53 (statement of
Gordon T. Wallis).
7' See text accompanying notes 19-24 & 33-39 supra. See also note 20 supra.
75 See note 63 supra; text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 48-56 & 62-65 supra.
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THE CHINESE WALL
Steel decision suggests otherwise," a bank owes the target a fiduciary
duty to refrain from using the target's confidential information in decid-
ing whether to finance the tender offer. 8 When asked to finance a hostile
takeover of a customer, a bank should construct a Chinese Wall within its
loan department as a defense against possible allegations by the target
that the bank misused the target's confidential information. The bank
should design this Chinese Wall7" to prevent the tender offeror and the
bank personnel involved in the loan to the offeror from gleaning any con-
fidential information about the target.
THOMAS McN. MILLHISER
77 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
78 See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
71 One possible Chinese Wall procedure which a bank could implement is the procedure
which Chemical used in Washington Steel. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra. An-
other possible procedure is the one which Irving Trust Company uses. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 21, at 47-48 (Irving Trust Co. Policies and Procedures Regarding Confidential
Information in Connection with Tender Offer Loans). In processing requests for tender offer
financing, Irving Trust bypasses normal loan approval processes. Immediately upon receiv-
ing the request, the officer who received the request will notify only the head of the division
to whom he reports. The division head will then notify, if available, his group executive, the
head of the Loan Administration Division, the president, and the chairman of the board.
This group of people are the only individuals in Irving Trust who determine whether to
grant the loan. Members of the group cannot discuss the tender offer with anyone else in-
side or outside the bank, except those directly involved with the tender offer or the loan.
The group members make sure that no bank employee misuses any confidential information
relating to the tender offer, the offeror, or the target. In addition, the group members see
that no person conveys confidential information to any officer or employee in Irving Trust's
personal Trust Division or to anyone who has any responsibility for the investments of the
bank's own funds or customers' funds. Id. Interestingly, Irving Trust's procedure not only
constructs a Chinese Wall within the loan department but also constructs a Chinese Wall
around the loan department to prevent confidential information from flowing to the trust
department. Id. See also note 3 supra.
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